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Introduction
International financial flows play a central role in the international monetary system, not just because they represent the necessary counterpart to trade flows. In good times, they channel savings to the countries and regions of the world where they are most productive. In crisis times, they have the potential to disrupt the domestic financial systems of the most vulnerable countries and therefore constitute a key factor affecting global financial stability. International financial flows also represent one of the corner stones of the contemporary "dilemmas" and "trilemmas" that link monetary policy, exchange rates and the capital account (Rey, 2013) . Together with trade flows, international capital flows act as a powerful channel through which domestic shocks are transmitted across borders. Finally, the composition of international capital flows underlines the concept of "global liquidity", which plays a central role in the international monetary system (CGFS, 2011) . For all these reasons, close monitoring of international financial flows is essential to assess the state of the global economic environment.
In recent years, international capital flows have registered profound changes, not only in terms of their magnitude but also their geographical patterns and composition by types of flows: bank flows, foreign direct investment (FDI), and portfolio (debt and equity) flows. At this stage, the explanatory factors and implications of these changing patterns are not clear; they will likely trigger a debate in academic and policy circles alike. This policy brief aims to contribute to this debate by presenting key stylized facts on international financial flows. We focus mostly on gross rather than net flows, which tend to be more commonly analyzed, but we also present a short analysis of the latter.
We outline likely explanatory factors for these developments and sketch out their implications, based on existing research.
The objective here is primarily to get the facts right, but this proves somewhat challenging, as international financial flows are subject to measurement problems.
Reconciling stock and flow measures is a further challenge. For this reason, we crosscheck the information provided by different sources and report differences when they are substantial. The bulk of the analysis relies on the IMF Balance of Payments database, which reports data at a quarterly frequency . We complemented this with specific data sources for some countries, such as the BIS Locational Banking Statistics and the TICS data for the US, which provide a wealth of information on the world's largest economy. We also report data from EPFR, which show much larger retrenchments in the recent period, and discuss these data in a Box C. We narrowed down the analysis to 40 countries, which represent more than 90% of world GDP. In the appendix we report the full data for G20 countries, owing to their systemic relevance.
Our focus is on recent evolutions (2012Q1-2014Q4). We compare current trends with
the pre-crisis period 3 . The global financial crisis and its immediate aftermath have already been analyzed extensively elsewhere (in particular by Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011) . For this, we develop "retrenchment ratios" and report them for all countries and for all available sectors (FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, and "other investments").
We also use longer-run statistics for aggregate data to get a historical perspective, and
we comment on shorter-run dynamics when they are particularly interesting. Overall, four key stylized facts emerge from the exercise.
First, gross international capital flows appear to be historically weak and have not recovered from the "Great Retrenchment" (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011) observed in the wake of the global financial crisis. This is true in absolute value (when flows are measured in US dollars) but also when expressed as a percentage of global GDP. The weakness of international financial flows, therefore, not only reflects the sluggishness of the world economy; it goes beyond this, in a way reminiscent of the recent "global trade slowdown" (Hoekman, 2015) 4 . This evolution is puzzling as it could mean, if it persists, that the global economy is becoming more fragmented than it used to be, after decades of increasing globalization. Although one could indeed expect a correction from the levels observed in the period immediately preceding the global financial crisis, the level of inflows is low even if one takes a longer-term perspective, particularly for advanced economies.
The second stylized fact is that the weakness of international financial flows seems to affect all economic regions, albeit to a different extent. We provide in this note a battery of indicators that help monitor the evolution of international flows. Our "retrenchment ratios" report the change in in-and outflows for all 40 countries (and eight regions and country groupings), in absolute terms and in percentage of GDP. They are expressed as the difference between the value of these flows in the pre-crisis period (2005Q1-2007Q2 ) and the post-crisis period (2012Q1-2014Q4). Our summary tables also provide the decomposition by type of flows (see below). When looking at the balance of payments data, the fall is very broad-based across countries, but it is more pronounced 3 We define the pre-crisis period as 2005Q1-2007Q2 (2005 is the first year of the new IMF BPM6 database). Taking this period as benchmark should not be interpreted in a normative way, especially given that this period was likely characterized by exceptional buoyancy of capital flows. 4 International trade flows appear very weak compared to pre-crisis levels, which in itself is not very surprising given that economic activity is also less robust. More strikingly, global trade, which used to increase at twice the pace of global GDP, is now growing at roughly the same pace, suggesting that the relation between trade and GDP has changed, owing to a combination of cyclical and structural factors, as outlined in Hoekman (2015) .
for advanced than for emerging market countries. Among advanced economies, the current level of inflows is back to the level that was registered in the mid-1990s. Among emerging market economies (EMEs), the fall is comparatively smaller, partly because the rise recorded in the decade preceding the global financial crisis was smaller (which in turn could be related to the crises that affected EMEs in the 1990s, to the lower level of financial development, overall, and to less open capital accounts). Euro area countries, especially those in the so-called periphery, recorded significantly lower flows as a percentage of GDP. This is consistent with the fact that the recovery was slower in advanced economies, particularly in Europe, compared to EMEs. A sectoral decomposition reveals that the fall in financial flows to and from Europe was particularly substantial for bank flows, which can be related to the fact that the European crisis markedly affected the banking sector. There are important differences between these balance of payment data and the type of portfolio inflows reported, e.g. in the EPFR database (the latter shows massive declines in inflows to EMEs over the recent period): these differences are analyzed in the last section below, especially in
Third, the global patterns of net flows have also recorded significant changes. Overall, net flows have fallen substantially, mirroring to a large extent current account changes.
In the United States, net inflows are currently about half what they were before the crisis, in line with the reduction of the current account deficit. In Japan, net flows have switched from substantial net outflows to net inflows in the years following the crisis.
Canada has also switched from net outflows to net inflows, but this change happened earlier, in the course of 2008. For Germany, by contrast, net outflows are larger, if anything, reflecting a growing current account surplus. Among EMEs, several countries now record lower inflows, such as Argentina, South Africa, Russia and South Korea (these last two countries actually record net outflows in the recent observations). We relate these changing patterns in net flows to changing patterns in gross flows for selected economies, and show in Chart Appendix 2 net inflows for all G20 countries (as for gross flows). This note also briefly mentions the reduction in global imbalances and the main factors that may explain it.
Fourth, while all types of flows have been affected by the slowdown, some have been significantly more resilient than others, resulting in a marked change in the composition of financial flows. Specifically, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have fallen relatively less than other types of flows, while bank flows have plummeted (even turning negative 5 ). Portfolio flows are in the middle, and within this category, debt instruments have fallen much more than equities. As a result of these changes, the composition of international financial flows is now drastically different. Whereas the "other investment" category (mostly bank flows) used to account for more than 40% of total flows before the crisis, these flows now constitute a small share of the total. By contrast, the share of FDI has roughly doubled, from 24% to 45%. Within the portfolio category, the different paths described above have also led to a considerable reallocation: before the crisis, portfolio debt used to be more than twice the size of equity flows, whereas they are now of roughly equal magnitudes.
Building on existing research, several factors can be put forward regarding the likely causes of these evolutions. Bank flows may have been more strongly affected than other types of flows because of the problems that plagued the banking sector in advanced economies and led them to undertake a deleveraging process. As is well documented by now, the interbank market froze in the wake of the financial crisis, which affected crossborder lending by banks to other financial institutions. The changing composition of international financial flows may, therefore, reflect the disintermediation process that characterizes the global economy. Importantly, local lending by foreign bank affiliates may now substitute cross-border lending (IMF GFSR, 2015) . In addition, the "Great
Trade Collapse" (Baldwin, 2009 ) and ensuing "trade slowdown" (Hoekman, 2015) This policy brief relates to existing studies that explored the recent evolution of international financial flows. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) provided an early analysis of the "Great Retrenchment" in international capital flows. They noted, in particular, that bank flows were hit the hardest, and that the retrenchment was shorter-lived for emerging economies. This policy brief shows that this retrenchment continued and even amplified beyond the early stage of the crisis. Bluedorn et al. (2013) have assembled a large database covering 147 countries since 1980 at an annual frequency and 58
countries at a quarterly frequency. They document and highlight the high volatility of international capital flows, with FDI flows being comparatively less volatile than bank and portfolio flows (but these last two types of flows are not fundamentally different in terms of volatility). While they do not find significant differences across country groups -advanced economies (AEs) versus emerging markets EMs -regarding the volatility of gross flows, they note that AEs "experience greater substitutability across the various types of net flows and greater complementarity of gross inflows and outflows". Our policy brief also relates to a large strand of the literature that sought to identify the determinants of international capital flows, including Broner et al. (2013) , Forbes and Warnock (2012) , Fratzscher (2012) , Ghosh et al. (2014) , Puy (2015) , Erce and RieraCrichton (2015) 8 and especially the papers that focus on the determinants of bank flows (see e.g. Buch and Goldberg, 2015 , and the literature reviewed therein). By focusing on gross and not just net flows, we hope to contribute to the analysis put forward by Obstfeld (2012) , who emphasizes the role of gross flows. Importantly, however, we focus here predominantly on international capital flows and not stocks (i.e. the international investment position, in net and gross terms). This is not to say that stocks do not matter, as clearly they do, but flows provide an early evaluation of where stocks are going and catch substantial attention in themselves. The present paper also echoes the analysis of Borio and Disyatat (2015) , who emphasize the importance of financing in the analysis of the external sector. Our policy brief complements recent contributions that focused on the vulnerability of EMEs to sudden stops of capital flows, and analyzed the role of gross flows separately, aiming to distinguish the impact of inflows from that of outflows (see e.g. Alberola et al., 2015 , and the references therein). Finally, while we do not aim to evaluate the impact of capital flows on growth, our policy brief relates to the strand of the literature that looked at the short-and long-run effects of capital flows on growth (see, for instance, Blanchard et al. 2015, Bussière et al. 2015, Reinhart and 8 These papers take mostly an empirical approach; see Tille and Van Wincoop (2010) for a theoretical view. Reinhart, 2009 and the references cited in these papers). We hope that the stylized facts presented here will feed into this debate 9 .
The rest of the note is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on total gross flows 9 We do not consider, in this short policy brief, the effect of capital controls and other tools aimed at managing international capital flows. Interested readers may check IMF (2012), Ostry et al. (2011 Ostry et al. ( , 2012 , Pasricha et al. (2015) , , as well as the references therein. 10 Although the appendix lists the euro area as a separate economy (thus abstracting from intra-euro area flows), the aggregate flows reported in sections 2 and 3 below are based on individual euro-area countries, thus taking into account intra-euro area flows.
• Foreign assets constituted a significantly bigger share of portfolios; the value of those assets also rose relative to GDP generally (financial deepening, valuation ef fect).
• Financial globalization had been more pronounced in AEs than EMs, the former receiving more gross inflows than the latter (chart 2).
• The size of current account imbalances and of creditor/debtor positions had become more dispersed (Bracke et al., 2008) .
• The banking sector in AEs had been one of the key drivers of financial globalization.
Banks extended their international activities during the globalization process, either through plain cross-border lending or via foreign affiliates, which played an important role in the subsequent period (see Goldberg, 2011, 2012 , and the references therein). Since 2010, gross cross-border financial flows have not returned to the buoyancy of the pre-crisis period. Instead, as of the end of 2014, they seemed to have settled at a "new average" that looks to be below 5% of GDP (Chart 3). This muted revival raises questions about whether the pre-crisis intensification of global financial linkages, summarized above, was too exuberant. While emerging economies fared much better than the advanced countries after the global financial crisis, the latter account for a much larger share of total flows than emerging markets (the ratio is about 1 to 10) 12 . As a result, the fall recorded by the former could not be offset by the recovery of the latter, and global flows are now smaller than they were before the crisis.
The
In emerging markets, gross capital flows were significantly more resilient than in advanced economies already in the early phase of the crisis (Chart 4). exposures -in particular of the banking sector -that go in both directions.
Another factor could be the exchange rate for some countries, again via balance-sheet vulnerabilities related to the currency mismatch between the assets and liabilities not only of the financial sector but also households and firms. Finally, contrary to the general shrinkage that emerges from the world picture, Asia and Latin-America generally recorded a rise in their outflows (Chart 5). Likewise, they became more dependent on external funding by a substantial amount, with rising inflows (see Table   Appendix 1 and 2).
We now look beyond aggregate facts and investigate country-level developments. To that purpose, we developed a simple metric, which we call a "retrenchment index". This . We use both a retrenchment index in absolute value (Table 1 presents the top and bottom 10 countries, Table Appendix 1 reports data for the whole sample) and one in relative terms, dividing the absolute difference by GDP in the first period (see Table   2 , and Table Appendix 2 for the full sample). The first indicator is informative about the magnitudes at play and about which countries contributed most to the global retrenchment, but it puts more weight on large countries and therefore blurs the comparison across countries, which is why we complemented it with the second indicator. We thus obtain a clear picture. First, capital flows indeed intensified in the BRICs and in some "safe havens" such as Luxembourg and Singapore. As a matter of fact, the intensification of inflows to Luxembourg suggests that "financial centers" have continued to cater for the redistribution of flows across countries. Second, by contrast, the retrenchment of capital flows turns out to be the most severe in western European countries, including the UK, peripheral EMU countries and France. Research focusing on EMU countries pointed out the large flows that characterized EMU countries prior to the crisis (see e.g. Hale and Obstfeld, 2014) .
Global patterns in net flows
Turning now to the global patterns of net flows, significant changes have also been recorded since the crisis. Overall, net flows have fallen significantly, mirroring to a large extent the changes registered in the current account 13 . This decrease in net flows, in absolute value, as reported already in Bluedorn et al. (2013) , is consistent with the fact that global current account positions have also fallen in absolute value (see the last chart of Chart Appendix 2). Chart 6 reports net flows as a percentage of GDP for selected economies, while Chart Appendix 2 reports these data for all G20 countries 14 .
In the United States, net inflows expressed as a percentage of GDP have decreased by about 50% when the pre-and post-crisis periods are compared, in line with the reduction of the current account deficit over the same period (the US current account 13 The financial and current accounts should in principle match each other; in practice they do not, because the changes in international reserves should be taken into account, and because of sometimes large net errors and omissions.
14 We omitted Saudi Arabia for data availability reasons.
deficit peaked at 5% of GDP in 2007 and has fluctuated at around 2.5% in recent years).
The decomposition of net flows into gross inflows and outflows reveals that the falling magnitude of net inflows is mostly due to lower gross inflows in the US (net purchases of US assets by non-residents), rather than higher gross outflows (net purchases of foreign assets by US residents). To anticipate the discussion in Section 3 (which decomposes flows by types), lower gross inflows in the United States are mostly due to portfolio debt and to the "other investment" category, which includes bank credit.
Another interesting example in this respect is Japan, where net flows have switched from substantial net outflows before the crisis to net inflows in the years following it:
this should not be surprising, since during the same period, Japan's trade surplus has In all three cases, higher net inflows largely result from foreign residents buying more In turn, the reduction of global imbalances, as shown in Chart Appendix 2, can be related to a number of factors. The fall in oil prices reduced both net oil imports for oilimporting countries and net oil exports for oil-exporting countries, with sizeable effects on global imbalances (in 2007, the surpluses of oil-exporting countries combined were the largest contributors to global surpluses). Meanwhile, the progressive evolution of
China's growth model away from an export-led economy to stronger domestic sources of growth has led to a noticeable reduction in the supply of traded goods (Gaulier et al., 2014) . In parallel, lower aggregate demand in advanced economies, particularly in the import intensive categories of expenditures such as business investment, has affected real imports from AEs significantly (Boz et al., 2014) . All these factors have contributed to the reduction of global imbalances, which correspond to lower flows in the financial account.
Factors of a more financial nature might have also played a role in taming net balances.
In particular, we do not include transactions in foreign reserves in our measure of resident outflows. Yet, the accumulation of foreign reserves is a way for residents to accumulate savings abroad (Broner et al., 2013) , so ignoring them may understate the accumulation of holdings abroad. In addition, well-known measurement issues around errors and omissions might interfere with our stylized facts (errors and omissions tend to be large during periods of turmoil and might reflect partly resident capital leaving a country without being reported).
When the composition of capital flows matters

Different components, different degrees of resilience
While the previous section focused on aggregate flows, we now turn to the decomposition by main categories, which reveals that the collapse of international financial flows has been very uneven (Chart 7) 15 . Strikingly, foreign direct investment (FDI) has been very resilient (flows in the post crisis period are just one notch below their pre-crisis level), whereas flows in the "other investment" category -which comprises bank flows -have been almost completely wiped out. Portfolio flows come somewhat between these two extremes, but even there, significant heterogeneity prevails: portfolio equity flows have been much more resilient than debt flows, which have halved between the pre-and the post-crisis periods. The resilience of equity flows bodes well for the ability of the economy to withstand forthcoming shocks as it has better risk-sharing properties than debt (Albuquerque, 2003) . One should underline, nonetheless, that there has not been a substitution between types of flows: all flows have fallen, but in different proportions.
As a result of these different evolutions, the composition of world flows is now
fundamentally different from what it used to be before the crisis (Chart 8). In the precrisis period, the "other investment" category used to constitute the bulk of global flows, with a share of 44%, whereas this share is now about 12%. By contrast, whereas FDI used to represent less than a fourth of the total, in the post-crisis period FDI amounts to 45% of total flows. Finally, the share of portfolio investment has increased, from about one-third to more than half. Within the portfolio category, the share of debt 15 In this section we focus on the asset side of international portfolio flows. In principle, the data should match the data series on the liability side at the world level. However, due to statistical errors and since our database does not include all countries in the world, global assets and liabilities do not match exactly. In spite of these discrepancies, the data for global liabilities lead to the same conclusions, in terms of which flows have been the most resilient. Another challenge is that not all countries report the split between debt and equity in the "portfolio" category, or at least not since 2005. To provide a meaningful comparison, we have therefore split this chart (and the subsequent one) in two, showing first the broad "portfolio" category for the whole sample, and then the debt/equity split for the restricted sample of countries, losing in the process Argentina, China, India, Mexico and Turkey. We also omitted Saudi Arabia for data availability reasons related to the "other investment" account.
has fallen, from two-thirds to about half, compared to the share of equity, which has risen correspondingly (as shown in the lower panel of Chart 8).
Before turning to possible explanations for this dramatic change in the composition of global financial flows and its likely implications for the global economy, it is worth exploring the geographical breakdown of the flows.
To that aim, we construct "retrenchment ratios" that reflect the change in in-and outflows in absolute terms and in percentage of GDP. They are expressed as the difference between the value of these flows in the pre-crisis period (2005Q1-2007Q2) and the post-crisis period (2012Q1-2014Q4). Table 3 reports the ratio of the post-crisis flows divided by the pre-crisis flows for the main regions of the world, on the asset and on the liability sides. Several key findings stand out.
• First, the collapse of the "other investment" category can be predominantly attributed to advanced economies: the fall is particularly pronounced for Western Europe, and very noticeable for North America, for capital flowing both in and out. For Western Europe, the flows have been negative in the post-crisis period because assets and liabilities have been sold, resulting in negative gross flows. This is consistent with the fact that the European crisis affected the banking sector, and led to substantial deleveraging and disintermediation thereafter (which Section 3 will return to).
• For other regions, the evolution of this "other investment" category has been very different. In particular, in Asia flows in both directions have increased between the two periods. In Latin America, "other investments" have increased markedly on the "asset"
side (this is particularly the case for Brazil; see Chart Appendix) and rose slightly on the "liability" side. For Eastern European countries, "other investments" have increased on the asset side but decreased significantly on the liability side. Overall, the collapse in other investment flows originating from and going to advanced countries (North America and especially Western Europe) was less than compensated by the rise recorded in other regions because the size of these regions in the pre-crisis flows was overwhelming for advanced countries (international financial flows are much larger for
AEs than for EMEs).
• Turning to the other flows, one can note that FDI flows have been fairly resilient for most regions of the world; they even show an increase, on the asset side, for all regions except Western Europe. On the liability side also, FDI has increased between the two periods, except for Western Europe, North America, and Eastern Europe (in both cases a fall by 15% to 20%).
• Finally, concerning the portfolio category, we need to distinguish between debt and equity (the former has fallen much more than the latter at the global level). Portfolio debt flows have fallen substantially for Western Europe and North America. By contrast, for equity the flows have fallen by a lesser extent.
Chart 9 below shows the composition of gross flows on the "asset" and on the "liability" side for advanced and for emerging market economies (the Chart Appendix shows these data for all G20 countries).
Changing composition of international financial flows: explanatory factors and implications
The While it is usual to list separately the causes and the consequences for expositional purposes, several factors can be seen, both as a cause and a consequence. One obvious factor to underline in this respect is the fact that economic activity has been weak since the global financial crisis; the recovery has regularly disappointed, and international organizations such as the IMF have repeatedly revised their global growth forecasts downwards. Weak economic activity is both an explanatory factor for weak financial flows, and, since negative shocks are transmitted through financial linkages, a consequence. In this respect, the European crisis has played an important role. The fact that European periphery countries faced massive capital flights in recent years is documented in Buch et al. (2016) , who investigate the role of Eurosystem liquidity provisions during the adjustment process.
Another key factor to underline is that some types of international financial flows seem to be inherently more volatile than others. In this respect, bank flows and portfolio flows are often described as "hot money" (see, for instance, Bluedorn et al., 2013) . By contrast, FDI flows are typically more stable over time, which is why they are generally considered as a safer form of financing (in addition to other benefits they carry, such as technological transfers). One should of course nuance a little bit this appreciation, to the extent that "other investments" include very different components such as net credit and advances, which are not prone to particular instability (see Box A). One could also consider that flows in this category help to enhance global liquidity, as suggested, for instance, in CGFS (2011). Also, within portfolio flows, equities have been more resilient than debt. Yet, overall, the behavior of international financial flows after the global financial crisis reflects the traditional wisdom: the flows that are considered to be the most volatile are precisely those that saw the largest decline.
The different components of financial flows have therefore been faithful to their reputation: "hot money" (with the exception of equity flows) has evaporated quickly, whereas FDI has been more robust. Looking forward, this may suggest more stable flows as the resulting composition is richer in the more stable FDI flows. However, other elements need to be considered as well to get a full assessment. Table 4 , which presents key statistics on the volatility of the main categories of financial flows during the main subperiods considered here (and for the whole sample), confirm these established stylized facts (bearing in mind of course that both sub-periods are short, thus enabling few observations to calculate these statistics). For instance, FDI, which was less volatile than "other investments" before the crisis, was also less volatile after the crisis, and if one looks at the whole period.
The factors behind the collapse in cross-border banking flows have been analyzed in CGFS (2011) To some extent, the fall in bank flows could be interpreted as a correction from the "global banking glut" that prevailed in the pre-crisis period (Shin, 2011) , through which European banks helped to enhance intermediation capacities in the US. These considerations represent a convincing argument as to why it is important to look at gross and not just net international financial flows. Meanwhile, recently, McQuade and Schmitz (2016) have looked into the cross-country heterogeneity of gross capital flows.
They found, in particular, that gross inflows in the post-crisis period (which is defined slightly differently from ours) were higher for the countries with smaller external and internal imbalances in the pre-crisis period.
The fact that international banking flows have fallen dramatically could also reflect the disintermediation process that intensified in the wake of the global financial crisis 16 . In turn, this process could result from different factors. Several prominent observers have pointed out the effect of financial regulation reforms, which could explain why the banking sector seems to be losing ground, compared to financial markets (see, for instance, Tarullo (2012 Tarullo ( , 2014 , CGFS (2010), Gambacorta and Van Rixtel (2013), etc.) .
This particular factor can be seen as a more permanent component than other determinants such as the VIX. Several studies have also pointed out that the exceptional measures put in place after the crisis have a substantial domestic bias, which could have played a role in the global retrenchment process (see e.g. Beck et al., 2015; Forbes, Reinhart and Wiedalek, 2015) . The IMF GFSR (2015) summarizes these different elements: "Although the cutback in cross-border lending was triggered by the crisis, regulatory changes and weaknesses in bank balance sheets have contributed significantly to the subsequent retrenchment." Moreover, it is also possible that local lending by affiliates has (partly) replaced crossborder lending. Still, according to the GFSR (2015), "The relative shift on the part of foreign banks away from cross-border lending and toward more local lending through affiliates has a positive effect on the financial stability of host countries. Cross-border lending compounds adverse domestic and global shocks. In contrast, foreign-owned subsidiaries, particularly those with better-capitalized parent banks, tend to behave less procyclically than domestic banks around domestic crises."
Another potential explanatory factor lies in the recent weakness of international trade flows (as documented, for instance, by Hoekman, 2015) . Indeed, trade credits are included in the "other investment" category, such that the weakness of international trade will mechanically affect this type of flow. One element to bear in mind, however, is that causality can run both ways. Indeed, trade credit issues have been highlighted as one of the potential causes of weak trade (see, for instance, Hahn, Amity and Weinstein, 2011, or Chor and Manova, 2012) . More importantly, trade credits amount to fairly low levels and cannot account for the fall in investment flows. On the other hand, another explanation could relate the fall of trade and financial flows. Indeed, Aviat and
Coeurdacier (2007) find (using instrumental variables to account for the fact that both variables are endogenous) that the two types of flow are complementary in a gravity framework.
Conclusion
This policy brief has presented four main stylized facts on international financial flows in recent times, focusing on the comparison with the pre-crisis period. Several factors can be put forward to explain these changes. They range from general factors, such as the weakness in the global recovery and the associated degree of uncertainty, to more specific factors, affecting certain regions and sectors more than others. Among the latter, the European crisis seems to have played a key role, as it is really flows to and from Western Europe that shrank the most. Regarding the sectoral composition, several explanations can be put forward for the collapse in bank flows.
The need to repair bank balance sheets and the substitution of cross-border flows by local lending by affiliates have been documented extensively. In addition, regulation may have played a role (GFSR, 2015, for instance).
The consequences of these changes, for financial stability issues, are not clear at this stage. The fact that the share of "hot money" has gone down while that of FDI has increased may lead to a more stable international monetary system, but the concept of "hot money" remains somewhat elusive (bearing in mind that many operations under the "other investment" flows contribute to the liquidity of markets) and it is hard to gauge if the pre-crisis properties and specificities of the various types of flows that we focused on will prevail in the "new normal". That said, "hot money" may actually impose discipline on the receiving countries, which are exposed to sudden stops in case of hazardous macroeconomic management. The changes that have taken place since the global financial crisis may correspond to a simple normalization, as suggested for instance by Coeuré (2015) , after rather "exuberant" times in the pre-crisis period.
Box A -A deeper look at the "other investment" category
In our main text, we think broadly of the "other investment" category as bank flows, as it is generally assumed that they constitute the bulk of this category. This box gives more details on the exact composition of "other investment" in order to highlight the differences between banking flows and other sub-categories. Other investments comprise the following types of financial flows: (1) Other equity, (2) Loans, (3) Currency and deposits, (4) Trade credit and advances, and (5) Other accounts receivable/payable. The last four components are categorized as debt instruments; it is not only possible to disaggregate these instruments by type of flow, but also by the counterparty, notably: (1) Central bank, (2) Deposit-taking corporations, except the central bank ("banks"), (3) General government, and (4) Other sectors. The typical breakdown of the "other investment" category is displayed in Table A1 : as it is easier to aggregate nonnegative stocks than flows, Table A1 shows the International Investment Position (stocks of assets), rather than the Balance of Payments (outflows), of 10 major eco nomies. Table A1 shows that the part of the "other investment" category that can be attributed to banks fluctuates between 30% and 71%. Whereas banks constitute the most important counterparty, the sub-category "Other sectors" also make up a large part -especially in countries such as the United States, Ireland and Luxembourg. A disaggregation of this counterparty is, however, not available for a large number of countries. Table A2 shows the breakdown of the counterparty "Other sectors" into financial (non-bank) corporations as well as nonfinancial corporations and households for a selected number of countries for which these data are available. For some countries (such as Luxembourg), adding the amounts from financial non-bank corporations to the amounts from banks sizably increases the contribution of the overall financial sector to the "other investment" category in the IIP.
Having established that banks and non-bank financial institutions make up a large part of the "other investment" category in terms of stocks, the question is whether these counterparties also drive much of the flows that are observed in the Balance of Payments. The underlying intuition is that the stocks in the International Investment Position due to banks can remain entirely stable and that its overall movement is entirely driven by large movements in the other sub-categories. Table A3 shows that the picture is indeed not as clearcut in the Balance of Payments, especially as flows can take on negative amounts. As gross outflows, or more accurately the net acquisition of financial assets, can be negative (both in total as well as for certain sub-categories), the aggregate positions mask substantial heterogeneity among the subcategories, which tend to cancel each other out. As such, bank flows might drive other investments to a large extent (as for example in the case of Switzerland where 95% of outflows of other investments are driven by bank flows) or actually only represent a small fraction and a counterbalancing force (as for example in the case of the Netherlands where banks flows are positive and small while, overall, other investment flows are negative and comparatively large).
We thus note that there is substantial heterogeneity across countries and sub-categories as well as important differences between stocks and flows. Despite these caveats, the question remains what drives other investments in the Balance of Payments at the global level. Inspecting the disaggregation of the other investment category, Figure  A1 shows that the overall level of other investments up to end-2009 is largely driven by the sum of flows from banks and other sectors. The contribution of bank flows to the positive net acquisition of foreign assets (outflows) up to 2008Q1 is on average 68%, whereas that of other sector flows is on average 29%. The collapse of net acquisitions of foreign assets in the "other investment" category in 2008Q4 and the subsequent quarters is once again driven by large negative bank and other sector flows. However, from 2010 onwards, the picture is less clearcut. One first notes that bank (and other sector) flows are of considerably smaller magnitude. Second, the two sub-categories do not seem to move in the same direction as during the crisis and pre-crisis period. As flows from banks and flows from other sectors sometimes have opposite signs, overall other investment flows are considerably smaller on aggregate. Third, one notes the increasing relative importance of public-sector flows (central bank and general government) which tend to sometimes reinforce and sometimes attenuate the flows from the private sector (banks and other sectors).
As established above, the contraction in other investments during the crisis is largely due to a contraction of banking flows (as well as the contraction of other sector flows, which are presumably driven by non-bank financial sector flows). One question that arises is whether this contraction affects all counterparty sectors to the same extent. This distinction is relevant, as different counterparties imply different types of lending, such as interbank lending or direct cross-border credit to non-financial corporations. Knowing which counterparties are affected suggests different implications with regard to the underlying drivers of movements in flows and stocks, regulatory policies or financial stability at large. One drawback of Balance of Payments data is that the counterparty (both in terms of residence and sector) is only known unilaterally, i.e. the amounts the banking sector in a given country holds vis-à-vis non-residents are known, but it is not known which country and which sector receives these flows. A comparison with the BIS International Banking Statistics can therefore be quite useful, as these data represent a sub-category of the International Investment Position. In particular, the BIS Locational Banking Statistics, which are organized around the residency principle as are the BoP/IIP Statistics, collect outstanding amounts of banking flows, disaggregated by several dimensions such as residence and sector of the counterparty. In terms of type of instruments, the BIS category "Loans and deposits"
closely matches the sum of "Loans" and "Currency and deposits" in the other BoP/ IIP for some of the countries*. Discrepancies arise most likely d ue to different reporting standards.** * One should note a particularity with regard to the treatment of loans and deposits of banks on the assets and liabilities side of the BoP/IIP. Whereas a loan of a bank in country A vis-à-vis a non-bank company in country B is characterized as a loan, a loan of a bank in country A vis-à-vis a bank in country B is characterized as a deposit. An inverse transaction, i.e. a loan of a non-bank company in country B vis-à-vis the bank in country A, represents a liability from the point of view of the bank in country A and is categorized as a deposit. Thus, whereas interbank loans are characterized as deposits from the point of view of both assets and liabilities, a loan between a bank and a non-bank company is characterized as a loan on the asset side a nd as a deposit on the liability side. See paragraphs 5.40 and 5.42 of the Balance of Payments Manual. ** The differences are most pronounced for the US and Japan. For the former, McCauley and Seth (1992) and Borio et al. (2011) , respectively, have noted that the amounts of the BIS International Banking Statistics considerably outnumber the ones from the US flow of funds. According to McCauley and Seth (1992) , underreporting in the flow of funds could be due to uncertainty about where a loan is actually booked.
Bearing the caveat of reporting discrepancies in mind, we are able to disaggregate bank loans and deposits by their counterparty using BIS data on cross-border banking flows. Figure A2 shows that the contraction during the crisis was largely driven by a slump in interbank lending; lending to non-bank actors also contracted, though to a lesser extent. However, one should bear in mind that the non-bank sector also comprises financial corporations that are not banks. The post-crisis period, in particular the years 2012 and 2013, is characterized by negative flows largely driven by the interbank market. Part of these contractions is driven by intra-group flows (i.e. cross-border bank lending among banks that belong to the same banking group); however, a disaggregation of these flows in the BIS Locational Banking Statistics is only available since 2014.
Box B -Lessons from the US TIC data
The above analysis focused on quarterly BoP data from the IMF balance of payments statistics, which allows comparison across countries. However, more can be learnt by turning to country-specific databases. In particular, the US Treasury International Capital (TIC) data provide a wealth of information on the world's largest economy, at a monthly frequency. Two key lessons can be drawn from the data. The first lesson is that the level of net TIC flows has fallen substantially in recent years. As the TIC data* tend to be volatile, Chart B1 shows the net flows using a 12-month rolling window. The flows are much below the pre-crisis level and back to the l evel they had in the mid-1990s. The second lesson is that net flows are currently a lot more volatile than they used to be (Chart B2, which shows the variance of the net TIC flows, calculated over a 12-month window).
Box C -Portfolio flows from the EPFR database
This box focuses on an alternative database that is often used to comment on portfolio flows to and from emerging market economies -EPFR (Emerging Portfolio Research). This database has several key assets compared to the balance of payment data used in the core of the text: it is available at a much higher frequency, including monthly and, from 2001, weekly, and until a more recent period of time. On the other hand, it is not directly comparable to the balance of payment data as it is collected using a different method. In particular, EPFR collects data from financial funds domiciled globally, while balance of payment data is meant to be comprehensively collected according to the resident/non-resident criterion. One limitation of EPFR is its limited coverage and possible bias; in particular, a substantial fraction of funds included in the EPFR sample is domiciled in (onshore) developed countries. With these caveats in mind, it is useful to look at the EPFR data, which point to a substantial decline in flows to EMEs in the course of 2013 (turning negative at the end of 2013 and remaining negative for most of the subsequent period, so significantly below balance of payment data).). This seems to be the case for all EMEs, whereas there is more hetero geneity across AEs.
